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Introduction 
 
  
 
If the financial press had been paying attention to some crucial barometers of currency instability 
in Thailand last year, the ensuing crisis in Asia would perhaps not have been so much of a 
surprise. On July 2,1997, the Thai government allowed the Baht to float against the Dollar for the 
first time in a decade. As we all now know, this effective devaluation set of a train of events which 
would shock all of the Asian economies which had hitherto enjoyed unqualified growth and 
prosperity for the last several years. 
 
To make sense of the events which precipitated the collapse of the Baht, we have to understand 
something about how exchange rates function in the international economy. The exchange rate of 
a currency with respect to another is simply the price of one currency denominated in another. 
These rates of exchange can either be fixed or floating. If rates float, it means that the price of 
one currency with respect to another is allowed to fluctuate freely as market conditions dictate. In 
this case, the price is determined in the same way that any other commodity is valued, by relative 
supply and demand. The complex of factors which determine this supply and demand for 
currencies forms the body of the study of international finance. An early attempt to put together 
the factors involved in such a model was put forth by English philosopher David Hume. The 
model we study in this course shows how money supply and demand, domestic and foreign price 
levels and exchange rates are related in open economies. 
 
The major difference between a system of floating rates and fixed exchange rates is that the 
exchange rate of a currency is fixed with respect to another when the central bank of one country 
makes the commitment to fix that rate. It is usually, but not necessarily, the country of origin 
whose central bank decides to fix a currencys rate of exchange. The action used to accomplish 
this is called currency market intervention, which simply means that the central bank will buy or 
sell currencies to fix the rate. 
 
With floating rates, the price of one currency with respect to another is set automatically by 
market forces. The factors which accomplish this are the two great conservation laws of 
international financial markets: purchasing power parity, and interest rate parity. I term these 
mechanisms conservation laws because they function analogously to the conservation laws of 
classical physics. When one billiard ball strikes another and transfers its energy to it, the 
momentum of the total collision remains at a constant value even though the two balls have 
divergent speed and direction. In the same way, the value of one currency is related to another by 
constant factors which can be calculated. Those factors are purchasing power parity, which 
states that when currencies are converted into one another, the value of equivalent goods which 
can be purchased is equal across currencies; and interest rate parity, which similarly states that 
the price of funds, paid as interest is the same across all currencies. If this were not the case, 
funds, or goods would flow across borders to equalize these rates. Floating exchange rates, 
therefore, act as a mechanism of adjustment, continuously balancing the values of currencies 
with respect to each other so that major disparities are not allowed to develop. 
 
With fixed rates, however, the central bank of the host country has to absorb these forces which 
are normally converted into exchange rate fluctuations. But, like the conservation laws of 
mechanics, the forces of supply and demand in the market must eventually force the value of a 
given currency to clear the market at the right price. If this rate of exchange has been held 
artificially low, or high, by central bank intervention, the exchange rate of this currency will shift, 
precipitously, like a seismic fault, into alignment. 
 
  
 
This is what happened with the Baht.. 
 
  
 
  
 
The Warnings of Trouble 
 
  
 
The International Monetary Fund Annual Report for 1997 includes the consultations which the 
fund made to its member nations for that year. In this most recent report, published before the 
advent of the crisis, the directors consultation to Thailand is an illuminating look into the state of 
the art of economic prognostication. 
 
Although the report gives some cautionary guidance on the situation in Thailand, it does not 
predict the full dimension of the crisis which was to come. The report does credit the government 
of Thailand for the policies which have led to prosperity and stability up to that point: "Directors 
strongly praised Thailands remarkable economic performance and the authorities intention to 
maintain a tight monetary stance." However, the Directors cautioned that the "large and volatile" 
capital flows had to be addressed. It was made clear that the policy of exchange rate stability had 
its cost. Recall that because Thailand committed to peg its currency to the dollar, it loses flexibility 
in its monetary policy. This is because the central bank has to maintain the monetary balance to 
keep the exchange rate steady. The IMF, sensing trouble with the large capital inflows, urged 
greater exchange rate flexibility. 
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[figure 1.1. The monetary base of a country is effectively equal to the liabilities on the balance 
sheet of the central bank. This monetary base, MB in the diagram, is multiplied through credit 
creation to equal the actual money supply in circulation. When funds flow into the country from 
abroad, (as in diagram [1.1]), the real money supply MB1/P must expand to (MB1 + FA)/P. These 
foreign assets FA, show up in the asset side of the central bank balance sheet (see T diagram). 
In order to keep the liability side at a constant MB, the central bank must sterilize the inflow of 
foreign assets with a sale of domestic assets (i.e., Baht denominated bonds).] 
 
  
 
  
 
In the face of large capital inflows, the Thai central bank had to sell domestic assets (i.e., Baht 
bonds) in order to keep its liabilities, hence the monetary base, constant(See table 1  total debt). 
If we assume that assets denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes, then interest 
rate parity must equalize the return across all currencies so that the dollar value rate of return on 
Baht denominated assets must equal the US interest rate plus any premium for exchange rate 
devaluation of the Baht. 
 
  
 
R (thai, dollar terms) = Rus + (Ee-E)/E. 
 
E is the Baht price of Dollars. 
 
  
 
In the present situation, however, the sale of domestic Baht denominated assets by the Thai 
central bank, simultaneously depleted the central bank holdings of Baht denominated assets and 
delivered these Baht domestic assets to private investors in Thailands real estate sector (men 
closely linked to the government). These Thai investors, by buying these bonds, had assumed an 
increased exchange rate risk as a result. The price for this transaction was thus the risk premium 
for a bond, B, with respect to a risk free asset, A, is 
 
r = r(B - A), 
 
so that the adjusted interest rate parity condition is now 
 
  
 
Rthai = Rus + [(Ee-E)/E] + r. 
 
  
 
The rate of return for financial instruments denominated in Baht is now augmented by the amount 
of the risk premium. This added premium on Baht denominated assets compounded the existing 
capital inflows. It is axiomatic that capital will find the risk-equalized investment which maximizes 
its rate of return, and that is exactly what happened in this case. Much of the foreign capital inflow 
was being sucked up by the boom in real estate and infrastructure development taking place at 
that time. While the IMF 1997 Annual report praised the Thai economy for its "remarkable 
economic performance," the report certainly did not sound an equally enthusiastic alarm over the 
riskiness of some of these investments. 
 
Apparently, the foreign creditors holding the notes to this debt started to sense that the structure 
was teetering. The economy, which, in the IMF report: 
 
  
 
"(The Directors) noted, economic fundamentals remained generally very strong, characterized by 
high saving and investment, a public sector surplus, strong export growth in recent years, and a 
manageable debt..." 
 
  
 
was appearing more and more to be a house of cards to the creditors on the street. This bubble, 
which the Directors claimed had levels of short-term debt which were "somewhat high," was 
about to burst (see table 1  short term debt). Perhaps the IMF report understated the fragility of 
the structure to hold off precisely the sort of catastrophic deflation which was about to occur. 
 
  
 
The Crash 
 
  
 
Nobody sees these things coming. In the high stakes game of debt and currency arbitrage, the 
game theoretical solution implies an outcome in which the first man out wins big, and the ones 
behind lose just as big when the pyramid crashes down. Perhaps the first match was lit when 
Japanese creditors sensed that the overall risk of their investments exceeded the risk-augmented 
interest on these Baht denominated instruments. This would be apparent to anyone who took the 
time to look at the figures for Thailands ballooning current account deficit (see table 3  current 
account). With a deteriorating current account how would Thailand service its debt? They started 
to shorten the maturities of their outstanding loans. After this, the capital flight compounded 
quickly. 
 
The Thai government, in its determination to defend the peg, was now hemorrhaging from its war 
chest of foreign reserves as it attempted to fend off the speculative attacks. [See fig. 1.2, below] 
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[fig. 1.2, To hold the Baht exchange rate fixed at E0 after the market decides it will be devalued to 
E1, the Thai CB must use its foreign reserves to buy Baht and thereby shrink the money supply 
from MB0 to MB1. 
 
  
 
  
 
Step 1. 
 
Expected devaluation of the Baht ( Ee becomes Ee+dE) shifts interest rate parity yield curve out. 
 
  
 
Step 2. 
 
Baht will depreciate to E0 if nothing is done. 
 
  
 
Step 3. 
 
To keep the peg at E0, Thai CB must use its reserves to buy dM amount of Baht. 
 
  
 
  
 
Table 1. Debt Picture of Thailand (figures in $U.S., Millions). 
 
 Source: Global Development Finance 1998, Country Tables p. 532, (Washington: The World 
Bank) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 
 
Total Debt 
  
 
  
  
 
65, 522 
  
 
83,166 
  
 
90,824 
 
Long Term Debt 
  
 
  
  
 
36,343 
  
 
42,071 
  
 
53,210 
 
Short Term Debt 
  
 
  
  
 
29,179 
  
 
41,095 
  
 
37,613 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Table 2. 
 
Foreign Currency composition of Thailands debt. 
 
Figures in Percentages. 
 
Source: Global Development Finance 1998, Country Tables p. 532, (Washington: The World 
Bank) 
 
 1995,1996,1997 
 
Deutsche Mark 
  
 
  
  
 
2.3 
  
 
2.4 
  
 
2.1 
 
Japanese Yen 
  
 
  
  
 
51.1 
  
 
47.7 
  
 
45.4 
 
U.S. Dollar 
  
 
  
  
 
23.8 
  
 
27.8 
  
 
32.1 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Table 3. 
 
Current account position of Thailand. Figures in US$ million. 
 
Source: Global Development Finance 1998, Country Tables p. 532, (Washington: The World 
Bank) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 
Current Acct 
  
 
-6,364 
  
 
-8,085 
  
 
-13,550 
  
 
-14,690 
  
 
-2,917 
 
Capital Acct 
  
 
10,271 
  
 
12,255 
  
 
20,713 
  
 
16,859 
  
 
-15,333 
 
 Note: Figures for 1998 are unreliable or unavailable. 
 
The IMF press release dated August 20, 1997 wrote the fitting epitaph to this Asian Tiger: 
 
After a decade of great economic success, aided by a strong track record of prudent 
macroeconomic policies, Thailands economic situation deteriorated progressively in recent 
years, and became increasingly vulnerable since 1993, as reflected in a persistent and widening 
current account deficit, which peaked at 8 percent of GDP in 1996; an associated high external 
debt burden (50 percent of GDP), of which some 40 percent is short-term; and serious weakness 
in the financial system, particularly,but not exclusively, in finance companies. The situation was 
exacerbated by external shocks. 
 
From mid-1996, Thailand was confronted with a series of adverse developments, including a 
sharp slowdown in exports and GDP growth; growing difficulties in the property sector; a sharp 
fall in the stock market; and some weakening of the fiscal position. 
 
During the first half of 1997, the authorities took some measures to address the growing signs of 
fiscal deterioration, as well as to strengthen the financial and property sectors, but these proved 
insufficient to restore market confidence. Growth and investment continued to slow, support for 
financial companies accelerated progressively, and there was evidence of growing financial 
disintermediation. In this environment, there followed a series of increasingly serious attacks on 
the Baht. [Emphasis added.] 
 
  
 
The Thai equity markets would ultimately lose some 50% of their value before the markets would 
stabilize, and this is indeed a loss in output which will not be recovered. The financial 
disintermediation referred to in the passage is the informational loss occurring as a result of 
destroyed fiduciary relationships in the banking system. True, we need to call for increased 
transparency an rationality in the Thai banking system, but it may be too late to avert a long 
convalescence. 
 
Of equal interest to the professional economist is the observation that the IMF engaged in its own 
style of historical revisionism by this statement in the above release: Thailands economic 
situation deteriorated progressively in recent years. This pronouncement is a sharp turnaround 
from the decidedly optimistic tone sounded in the Annual Report for 1997 which was written four 
months before the crisis. 
 
 Epilogue 
 
  
 
In the wake of the currency shocks reverberating through Asia, the community of professional 
economists and policymakers is once again looking for the touchstone which will allow reliable 
prediction of crises such as this. The problem shares some systemic features with efforts to 
predict stock price movements: any systematic predictive method will be incorporated into the 
rational expectations of the market and will therefore skew the results of the phenomena under 
study. A crisis is by definition an unpredictable event. 
 
This is not to say that the search for this holy grail is futile and should be abandoned. In the 
present case, there has been voluminous research into currency crises and an associated 
phenomenon, contagion. 
 
The IMF Survey, dated August 18th of 1997, presents a survey of the available wisdom on this 
subject. The article takes as its point of departure the 1979 study of financial crises by Paul 
Krugman, then of Stanford. Several features of the present crisis in Thailand could be gleaned 
from the theoretical results of Krugmans paper. Barometers of an impending crisis could be, inter 
alia, a higher demand for traded goods (and a corresponding deterioration of the current account: 
 
  
 
CA = CA(EP*/P; Y-T), 
 
  
 
Likewise, higher prices for non-traded goods leading to a real appreciation of the currency (in the 
present situation, the dominant non-traded item is real estate; 
 
  
 
P (price level) up implies q = EP*/P down). 
 
  
 
Further, according to Krugmans model, uncertainty about credit policy, or about the reserve 
losses that the home government is willing to sustain in order to defend the peg, are factors which 
could be indicators of an impending crisis. 
 
The IMF Survey article goes on to cite a summary of 25 empirical studies which provide support 
to the use of the sort of indicators implied by the Krugman model. The major problem, according 
to my point of view, is not the validity of these factors, but rather it is a surfeit of information 
without sufficient resolution. Any of these linked indicators in combination could provide a reliable 
touchstone for financial crisis if not for the fact that a crisis is a catastrophic event, the outcome of 
which is extremely sensitive to variation in the input parameters. Timing is crucial here, as is the 
very subjective psychology of the official and private actors in the game. I have some personal 
experience in doing technical analysis in the stock and futures markets. One thing you learn in 
that business is how fickle the markets are with respect to quick fluctuations. When the trendline 
has been heading up for so many clicks, your money is riding on a guess when the momentum is 
going to turn. Often, one sell order will shift the weight at a crucial fulcrum point, and dollars, like 
rats off a sinking ship, will flee as fast as they ran aboard. 
 
All markets show the same organic behavior. The game-theoretical solution is always: first in 
wins, cash rushes through the breach until there is no longer any return; all the players mill 
around the table testing, probing, for the avalanche fault. When it comes, its the same rush in 
reverse. This is how the cash flowed in Thailand. 
 
What, then, can we look for as a reliable feature of stability or instability? 
 
  
 
If one surveys the recent experience of the following economies: Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Thailand, what features of their economic terrain provide landmarks to guide us in our 
analysis. For one thing, all five economies have experienced healthy growth and export activity in 
recent years. Japan and Korea, have perhaps the most advanced manufacturing infrastructure, 
Thailand has the niche in the lower value-added trade, and Hong Kong and Singapore are more 
oriented to financial and service sectors. 
 
It doesnt appear, therefore, that infrastructure development, or the composition of trade are the 
determining factors in susceptibility to shocks in the currency or equity markets. 
 
The social infrastructure, likewise, shows great variability. Japan, Korea, and Singapore, for 
example, have populations which are virtually 100% literate with a high proportion of university 
educated workers. Japan and Korea have been shaken by recent financial crises, but Singapore 
has not. Thailand, a country with a much lower level of human capital investment is ground zero 
for the present crisis, but Hong Kong, a city with enormous inequalities in wealth and education 
has been able to hold a stable center. 
 
It appears to me that the crucial factor determining the reaction of these economies to the crisis of 
confidence sweeping the region is that of transparency and regularity in the banking system. 
Japan, which has financial institutions which have weathered the storms of change for up to 700 
years, has also relied on a tradition of handshaking between the government ministries and the 
zaibatsu which has perhaps sacrificed market rationality to the values of continuity and tradition. 
This private-public culture has led, in some cases, to a limitation of exposure to market forces and 
a lack of public scrutiny which in turn, has caused a crisis of confidence in Japanese institutions. 
Likewise, the Chaebols of Korea, and Thai property trusts have operated without the sort of 
oversight which we take for granted here. 
 
Finally, therefore, the question of managing crises leads to the recommendation for increased 
regulation and oversight of the credit sectors in developing economies. In the July 11, 1997 
conference on managing economic crises sponsored by the Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Morris Goldstein of the Institution for International Economics echoed the call for 
greater oversight of financial institutions, but other participants expressed doubt about the 
possibility of an enforceable standard for bank soundness. 
 
It is clear that if agreements such as Bretton Woods or the ERM have not held the industrialized 
economies to a policy agreement, there will be great difficulties in applying a binding financial 
standard to the economies of Asia. 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Notes: 
 
Annual Report 1997, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., p. 91. 
 
More precisely, to a basket of currencies heavily weighted with the dollar. 
 
The monetary base of a country is effectively equal to the liabilities on the balance sheet of the 
central bank. This monetary base, MB in the diagram, is multiplied through credit creation to 
equal the actual money supply in circulation. When funds flow into the country from abroad, (as in 
diagram [1.1]), the real money supply MB1/P must expand to (MB1 + FA)/P. These foreign assets 
FA, show up in the asset side of the central bank balance sheet (see T diagram). In order to keep 
the liability side at a constant MB, the central bank must sterilize the inflow of foreign assets with 
a sale of domestic assets (i.e., Baht denominated bonds). 
 
Another way to say this is to state that the Thai CB needed to soak up excess money in the 
economy by the open market sale of Thai government bonds. 
 
Global Development Finance 1998, Country Tables p. 532, (Washington: The World Bank) 
 
Most of this debt was in the hands of Japanese creditors (see table 2  foreign currency 
denominations of debt). 
 
Global Development Finance, ibid. 
 
Global Development Finance 1998, op. cit., p.532 
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